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Petitioner Prosper, Inc. respectfully submits its reply brief on appeal.

ARGUMENT
I. PROSPER5S REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The Workforce Appeals Board (hereinafter "Board") in its Brief (hereinafter B.
at

)5 states that it "supplements and corrects" Prosper Inc.'s (hereinafter "Prosper")

Statement of Fact. Prosper responds to the Board's supplemental facts as follows:
•

In paragraph 1, the Board states "The employer provides online classes to
customers in a variety of subjects." (B. at 2, paragraph 2). At the time of appeal,
Prosper did not provide online classes.

•

In paragraph 3, the Board states that Prosper "believed the claimant was missing
appointments." (B. at 4, paragraph 3). Iversen testified she missed appointments
(R. at 101, lines 15-19). It is inaccurate to correct the record to state that Prosper
"believed" these conditions were occurring.

•

In paragraph 7, the Board states a hearing was scheduled for "August 7, 2006".
(B. at 5, paragraph 7). The hearing date was April 11, 2006 (R. at 069).

•

In paragraph 7, the Board states "The employer was sent notice of the hearing
and an appeals brochure which instructed the employer to contact the witnesses
and make sure they would be able to participate in the hearing."(B. at 5,
paragraph 7). This statement is not supported by the record. There is no
brochure in the record except in the Board's briefs.

1

•

In paragraph 11, the Board states "Under Utah employment law, the claimant
must be shown to have been at fault in the discharge. Without proving any of the
complaints to have been true, the employer could not prove just cause." This is a
conclusion of law and not a statement of fact.

II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD MISAPPLIES THE LAW.
Hypothetical: After a long week at work, Julie is looking forward to dining at
her favorite restaurant. Upon being seated, she is disappointed to see that the server
named "Chet" is assigned to her table. She hopes that the service is better today. Once
again she is disappointed. In fact, if anything, the service is worse. Chet is chewing
gum, he mixes up orders, and above all, he sneezed on the table. Not wanting to make a
scene, on her way out Julie mentions her dissatisfaction to the Hostess.
If in this hypothetical Chet had intentionally poured coffee on Julie, and Chet
was terminated for his actions, then the restaurant may need to substantively prove that
Chet poured coffee on Julie. By contrast, if the complaint that Julie lodges is the ninth
customer complaint in the last two months, the restaurant is being injured by Chefs
conduct and the restaurant can terminate Chet for poor performance and customer
complaints without proving the particulars of each and every complaint lodged against
him.
With this in mind, a review of the Board's brief establishes that the Board views
this case as one wherein the particulars of each complaint need to be established by
competent evidence. The Board rejects the existence of the complaints as hearsay and
2

awards benefits on the grounds the employer failed to substantively prove that the
claimant performed poorly.
This case has been brought before the Court before. In its previous decision, the
Court deemed that the evidence of the existence of the complaints was admissible nonhearsay:
This evidence was not hearsay because it was not introduced for the truth of
the matter asserted—i.e., that the customer complaints were true—but simply
to prove that the complaints had been made. Cf. Kelley v. Airborne Freight
Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 346 (1st Cir.) ("We agree that a customer complaint offered
to show, for example, that a decisionmaker had notice of the complaint, rather
than to prove the specific misconduct alleged in the complaint, is not barred by
the hearsay rule."), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 932, 119S. Ct. 341, 142 L. Ed 2d 281
(1998). Prosper offered evidence of customer complaints about Iversen not to
establish the truth of any particular complaint, but simply to show she was the
object of numerous customer complaints and thus an employee who did not
perform satisfactorily, [emphasis in Brief] (B. at 7).
Though the Board acknowledges in its brief the language quoted above, the Board in a
misapplication of the law states "The Board did consider on remand, as it did originally,
that the employer had in fact received customer complaints about the claimant. What the
Board found was that the employer did not prove the substance of the customer
complaints was true." (B. at 7).
It is reversible error, as it was previously, for the Board to conclude "The
employer's allegations rest solely on hearsay evidence contradicted by claimant and
uncorroborated by other competent evidence." (Decision on Remand, R. at 347). The
complaints were introduced to prove that the complaints were made, not to prove that
they were true. As observed by the Court, "That the complaints are made is the real
problem from the employer's standpoint—not whether the complaints are "true" in the
3

usual sense." Prosper v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281, ^jl 3
fn.4, 168 P.3d 344; (R. at 331, fn 4).
Though the Board uses a large portion of its brief to cite to other jurisdictions,
the cases cited by the Board either sought to introduce the evidence to establish proof of
the matter asserted, or were found to be hearsay. In this case, however, the Court has
already ruled the evidence of the existence of the customer complaints is not hearsay.1
As the existence of customer complaints is not hearsay, this case is like
Rodriguez v. Filene 's Basement, Inc., 905 A.2d 177 (Ct. App. 2006) wherein the court
affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits on the grounds that "the three documented
instances of Ms. Rodriguez's 'rude and disrespectful conduct toward [Filene's]
customers during a seven-month period...clearly are acts that adversely affect a material
employer interest, i.e., good customer relations." Id. at 180.
Similarly, in Cameron v. Commissioner of Labor, 15 A.D.3d 722, 788 N.Y.S.2d
701 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) the court found that "Inasmuch as claimant's inappropriate
1

Though the Board states it has been unable to find similar cases, this case is more akin
to Delon v. LCR-MLimited Partnership, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77573 (W.D. La 2006)
wherein the federal district court ruled on a Motion to Strike Affidavit on the grounds
that the affidavit was claimed to be hearsay. In denying the Motion to Strike, the court
stated:
Complaints filed by customers and co-workers constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for termination. Arrington v. Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co., 93 Fed. Appx. 593, 2004 WL 362239, *4 (5th Cir. 2004); Sarffv.
Continental Express, 894 F.Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Hooven-Lewis v.
Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 274 (4T Cir. 2001). LCR-M asserts that the evidence of
the complaints, in the affidavit, is being offered not for the truth of the matter
asserted, but to show that complaints were made and reported. Because the fact
that the complaints were lodged is not being offered for truth, these statements
are admissible. Id. at *4.

4

conduct towards customers was potentially detrimental to the employer's business,
substantial evidence supports the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board ruling that claimant's rude and unprofessional manner amounted to disqualifying
misconduct." Id. See also, DuBois v. Commissioner of Labor, 19 A.D.3d 796, 796
N.Y.S.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005).
These decisions are examples of where customer complaints have been the basis
to deny unemployment benefits. Even in Utah, in Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, 972 P.2d
395 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that an employee can be terminated
for customer complaints (at-will employment termination was not contrary to an express
or implied contract nor public policy).
As was cited by Prosper in its appellate brief, the cases of Law Offices of David
Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 21, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and
Whipple v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2004 UT App 479 (Unpublished Opinion) are
unemployment cases where the employee's poor performance and objectionable
conduct resulted in a denial of benefits.
As such, non-hearsay customer complaints can be grounds satisfying the
requirements of a just cause discharge. This Court should apply a correction of error
standard, and reverse the Board's decision awarding benefits.

The Board states that whether an employer had just cause to terminate an employee is
a mixed question of fact and law, and as such, a decision should not be disturbed unless
it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. (B. at 1). This general standard
of review in unemployment cases misstates the standard to be applied here. Hearsay is
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335
(Utah 1993). " Tn reviewing [an agency's] interpretations of general questions of law,
5

III. ISSUES RAISED BY THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD BRIEF.
In addition to the argument that customer complaints are hearsay, the Board also
raise a number of other issues in their brief. Prosper will respond to these issues in
essentially the order presented:

A. Due Process
The Board in its brief (Point II, p. 22) states that "denying unemployment
benefits on the alleged customer complaints without an opportunity to cross-examine
those witnesses would deprive claimants of due process and defeat the provisions of the
Unemployment Insurance Act and 60 years of court rulings in this state." (B. at 22).
The Board also states in the Conclusion of its brief, that "Allowing the customer
complaints for the truth of the matter asserted would deprive claimant of her due
process rights." (B. at 30). This issue was previously raised by the Board and rejected:
The Board argues that admitting customer complaints as non-hearsay under rule
801(c), see Utah R. Evid. 801(c), violates Iversen's due process right to confront
witnesses. [*** 11] We have already ruled that if evidence is presented for some
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, a party is not denied
any due process rights when that evidence is admitted. See In re G.Y., 962
P.2d 78, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("Because the out-of-court statements were not
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, appellant was not denied any
opportunity to confront or cross-examine the declarant.") (emphasis added).
Prosper v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281, ^13 fn.5, 168
P.3d 344 (R. at 332, fn.5).
It is therefore unclear why the Board raises the issue again.

this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the expertise of
the [agency].' "(alteration in original). Allen v. Department of Workforce Services 2005
UTAppl86,l|6, 112P.3d 1238.
6

B. Possession of Evidence
Utah Admin. Code R994-508-109(9) (2008) states:
(9) Oral or written evidence of any nature, whether or not conforming to the rules
of evidence, may be accepted and given its proper weight. A party has the
responsibility to present all relevant evidence in its possession. When a party is
in possession of evidence but fails to introduce the evidence, an inference may be
drawn that the evidence does not support the party's position.
While ignoring the fact that non-conforming evidence (hearsay evidence) is admissible
in administrative hearings, the Board (Point III) cites to R994-508-109(9), to prescribe
error to Prosper for failing to introduce evidence claimed to be in Prosper's
"possession". The evidence that the Board asserts that Prosper possessed, but failed to
present, is the complaining witnesses' testimony. The Board somehow illogically
equates possession of the complaining witnesses' contact information with being "in
possession" of the evidence such witnesses might have been able to provide. The Board
argues "The employer 'was in possession' of the evidence since it knew the identity of
the customers, had contact information for those customers, and could have called them
as witnesses." (B. at 22).
Not only is it not logical for the Board to assert that having "contact information"
is the same as being "in possession" of evidence, but the Board then proceeds to draw
inferences from Prosper's failure to present such witnesses that "any employer could
say a claimant was discharged for customer complaints and not produce the customers"
and employers "have a significant reason to misrepresent the facts." (B. at 23). Such
inferences go well beyond the inferences contemplated in the Rule, and ascribes
improper motives to employers. Such a conclusion also seeks to compel the
7

introduction of evidence to prove the substance of the complaints rather than relying on
the existence of the complaints to establish just cause for discharge. As such, the
argument that Prosper failed to present all the evidence "in its possession" is without
merit.

C. Firsthand Evidence
The Board in its brief (Point IV) argues that none of Prosper's witnesses had
any firsthand evidence that Iversen missed any sessions with customers. This assertion
is troubling in light of the record. A review of the record establishes that Mr. Lorin
Hardy, Iversen's direct supervisor, knew Iversen missed sessions and discussed this
issue with her:
Judge:

Okay. Had you talked to her about missing appointments?

Hardy:

Every - 1 believe that, pretty much, every one of the instances that
are documented on Exhibit 16 we did have a verbal conversation, if
not via email and via the customer management system notes.

Judge:

Okay

Hardy:

Yes, we discussed these on a regular basis.

Judge:

Did she admit to missing appointments?

Hardy:

Yes. (R. at 094:6-18).

3

In (Point III) its brief, the Board also states that "the employer argues it would be
unduly burdensome to call the customers as witnesses but does not explain why this is
burdensome." Without conceding the point, this issue was not raised by Prosper in this
appeal.
8

In an admission against interest, this firsthand testimony of Hardy was even confirmed
by Iversen herself:
Judge:

Had they talked to you about missed appointments?

Claimant:

They had talked to me about specific clients-if a call came in or a
client said that I had missed a session-it was- Lorin would ask me
why I missed a session, or if I missed a session. (R. at 101:15-19).

As such, it is perplexing for the Board to assert that Prosper's witnesses "had no
firsthand evidence of missed sessions."

D. New Evidence
The Board in its brief (Point V), criticizes Prosper for allegedly introducing new
evidence regarding emails. A review of the record establishes that the Board
mischaracterizes Prosper's efforts to satisfy its marshaling obligation as an introduction
of new evidence.
As part of its obligation to marshal the evidence, Prosper identified those
portions of the record that might support the Board's ruling. Then, as permitted by the
Rule, Prosper proceeded to show how notwithstanding the marshaled evidence, the
decision to award benefits is not supportable.
In her testimony, Iversen suggested that one of the reasons why she was
receiving so many complaints was that Prosper spelled her name wrong in her email
address. Iversen presented no other evidence on this issue. Iversen gave no specific

9

examples of individuals that had complained about this issue nor did she identify
whether she had informed Prosper of this problem.
Under its marshaling obligation, Prosper needed to marshal this fact. But
Prosper refuted this claim not by introducing new evidence, but rather, by pointing to
those portions of the record that clearly establish that this issue is not what it is
suggested to be.
Iversen herself provided the ALJ a number of emails. (R. at 040-063). A simple
review of those pages establishes that Iversen primary email address in her
correspondence with her students was katrinaiversen@comcast.net. This is not new
evidence. Marshaling the record to establish that conclusions are not supported by the
record is not the introduction of new evidence. Furthermore, a discussion of Iversen's
email address is only relevant if Prosper is trying to prove specific emails were not
responded to. As such, the Board's criticism is misplaced.

E. Business Records Under Utah Rules of Evidence 803(6)
The Board in its brief (Point VI), rejects the notion that the customer complaints
are admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(6) or the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. In so concluding, the Board without citation states "The
employer argues that customer complaints should be admitted into evidence under the
business records exception to the hearsay rule. That would allow the complaints to be
used for the truth of the matter asserted in those complaints, something that this court

10

has already rejected in its remand decision." (B. at 24). This statement is inaccurate for
a number of issues.
First, Rule 803(6) is an exception to the hearsay rule. If evidence fall within the
definition of the business record exception, it is not hearsay, and can admitted for the
truth of the matter asserted.
Second, this Court did not "reject in its remand decision" that customer
complaints could not be used for the truth of the matter asserted. Since hearsay
evidence is admissible in administrative hearings, customer complaints can be admitted
for the truth of the matter asserted, and given its proper weight. Mayes v. Department of
Employment Sec., 754 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); See also Utah Admin. Code
R994-508-109(9) (2008) ("Oral or written evidence of any nature, whether or not
conforming to the rules of evidence, may be accepted and will be given its proper
weight.").
Third, the Court did not "reject in its remand decision" that the evidence was
inadmissible as a business record. The Court reversed on other grounds, and
specifically addressing 803(6) stated:
Prosper also argues that the [***6] Board erred by misapplying the business
records exception of the hearsay rule, see Utah R. Evid. 803(6), to the CMS
spreadsheet. We conclude, however, that the direct testimony and the CMS
spreadsheet were improperly excluded under rule 801(c), see id. 801(c), and
therefore reverse on other grounds. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for us to
consider whether the CMS spreadsheet constitutes an admissible business
record (emphasis added). Prosper v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT
App 281,1J8 fn.3, 168 P.3d 344 (R. at 329, fii.3)

11

Therefore, as the Board did not consider the customer complaints under Rule 803(6) in
its Decision on Remand, the Board has not decided all the issues required to be
resolved. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c)(2008).
In rejecting Rule 803(6) as grounds to admit the business record, the Board cites
to State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) regarding the admissibility of police
reports. Whether Prosper's Customer Management System ("CMS") records
substantively fall within an analysis similar to police records is yet to be decided.
However, the language of Bertul cited by the Board seems to allow the CMS record to
be used to establish the existence of the customer complaints. In Bertul, the court stated
(referencing Rule 63(13) the predecessor of Rule 803(6)), "Thus, whether police reports
are admissible depends on the nature of the records and the purpose for which they are
offered. Police records of routine matters are admissible under Rule 63(13), such
as the date a crime was reported." (Citation omitted) (emphasis added). Id at 1184.
Following this logic, Prosper's CMS record of the date and type of complaint
against Iversen is a record that is admissible under 803(6). A plain reading of the Rule
leads to a similar conclusion:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions,
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by . . . a person with
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to
make the . . . data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness . . . . Utah R. Evid. 803(6)

12

The introduction of the spreadsheet document from the CMS database cannot be
viewed in a vacuum. The customer complaints were in an electronic database. In order
to be available, some type of extraction and presentation was required.4 Unemployment
hearings are informal. Neither party was represented by counsel. The four-part test
outlined in Bertul was sufficiently satisfied to support Prosper's belief that it needed to
discharge Iversen in order to protect its legitimate business interests.5 Viewed in this
light, the CMS spreadsheet should have been admitted for this purpose as a business
record under Rule 803(6) as an exception to the hearsay rule.6

F. Marshaling Evidence
The Board in its brief (Point VII) argues "The employer here has made no
attempt to meet its marshaling burden." (R. at 29). Prosper respectfully cites to its brief,
pages 20-29, for its marshaling of the evidence, and its explanation of how the

4

Even if the foundation for the introduction of the evidence was unartfully laid by the
human resource manager, the rules governing the business record exception are to be
construed broadly and generously construed in favor of admission. Klinger v. Kightly,
889 P.2d 1372, 1377 fn. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
5

The Board also asserts that "the manager of human resources who prepared the
complaint report for the hearing had no personal knowledge of the students or the
complaints described in the report and knew little of the substance and particulars of the
allegations." (B. at 27). Under the business records exception, "the person testifying
need not have prepared the record nor have personal knowledge of the accuracy of the
information contained in them." Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 981, fn. 17 (Utah
1993)(citing affirmatively to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) in Wilson v. Zapata OffShore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 1991)).
6

Additionally, the evidence is still admissible under the Department's Administrative
Rules. See Utah Admin. Code R994-508-109(9)(2008) and R994-508-111(3)(2008).
13

marshaled evidence fails to support an award of benefits. The Board cites to no
evidence that Prosper failed to marshal. The Board's assertion that Prosper "made no
attempt to meet its marshaling burden" is without merit.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals
Board's Decision on Remand awarding unemployment benefits to Iversen. There is
sufficient admissible non-hearsay evidence to support the finding that Iversen was
terminated for just cause.

DATED this / 9 * 3 a y of June, 2008.

Daniel J. Anderson
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner
Prosper, Inc.
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ADDENDUM

FRANCES DELON VS. LCR-M LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
DOCKET NO. 2:04 CV 1419
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
LOUISIANA, LAKE CHARLES DIVISION
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77573

October 23, 2006, Decided
October 23, 2006, Filed
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion granted by, in part,
Motion denied by, in part Delon v LCR-M Ltd P'ship,
2006 US Dist LEXIS 77579 (WD La, Oct 23, 2006)

problems with Ms Delon had nothing to
do with [*2] her belief that they were
having an affair"

COUNSEL: [*1] For Frances Delon, Plaintiff Charles
H Peckham, Lundy & Davis, Houston, TX, David H
Hanchey, Lundy & Davis, Lake Charles, LA

Delon argues that these statements by Arendt are irrelevant because he was a counter employee, not a supervisor Delon argues that Arendt cannot give an opinion as to whether being "pushy and confrontational" was
a good or bad sales attribute

For L C R - M Limited Partnership, Defendant Thomas
H Kiggans, Betty C Burke, Mary Ann Mitchell Felton,
Phelps Dunbar et al, Baton Rouge, LA

MCR-M asserts that there is undisputed evidence
that one of the two primary reasons for the Plaintiffs
termination was poor working relationships with coworkers and her supervisor, the nature of which Delon
candidly admitted ' The affidavit of Arendt is one of
four affidavits by co-workers offered in support of LCRM's defense that Delon was terminated, in part, because
of poor relationships with co-workers

JUDGES: PATRICIA MINALDI, UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE MAGISTRATE JUDGE WILSON
OPINION BY: PATRICIA MINALDI
OPINION
MEMORANDUM ORDER

1 Deposition of Delon at pp 157-60, 168, 174176, 235-45, 252-54, 268-72, 277-78) Attached
to LCR-M's Motion for Summary Judgment [doc
28]

Presently before the court is an "Objection to and
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dennis Arendt" [doc 35]
This objection/motion was filed by the Plaintiff, Frances
Delon ("Delon"), in opposition to an affidavit used by the
Defendant, LCR-M Limited Partnership ("LCR-M"), in
support of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [doc 28]

Personality conflicts constitute a legitimate ground
for termination ' Accordingly, Arendt's testimony that he
found the Plaintiff to be pushy and confrontational is
[*3] relevant

The Plaintiff objects to the admission of Arendt's affidavit based on relevance and hearsay

2 See Sarffv Continental Express, 894 F Supp
1076 (SD Tex 1995), Hoov en-Lewis v C alder a,
249 F 3d 259, 274 (4th Cir 2001), Vore v Indiana Bell Telephone Co, 32 F3d 1161 (7th Cir
1994), Jackson v City ofKilleen, 654 F 2d 1181,
1183 (5th Cir 1981), Caro v City of Dallas 17
FSupp 2d 618 626 (ND Tex 1998)

The Plaintiff claims that following statements are
irelevant
Arendt states i n P 3 that "I did not find
her [Plaintiff] to be a pleasant person to
work with I found her to be pushy and often confrontational"

The statements Delon finds objectionable based on
hearsay are as follows

Arendt states in P 4 that "I did not
believe that was true [an affair] but my
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ADDENDUM

. "I know of customers who had similar
problems with her [Plaintiff] and some refused to deal with her."

Complaints filed by customers and co-workers constitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for termination. 3 LCR-M asserts that the evidence of the complaints, in the affidavit, is being offered not for the truth
of the matter asserted, but to show that complaints were
made and reported. Because the fact that the complaints
were lodged is not being offered for truth, these statements are admissible. Accordingly,

. "I occasionally reported these problems to Bobby Soileau."
. "I was also aware of complaints
about Ms. Delon from other employees
and customers prior to her allegation of
this affair."

3 Arrington v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
93 Fed. Appx. 593, 2004 WL 362239, *4 (5th Cir.
2004); Sarff, 894 F. Supp. 1076\ Hooven-Lewis,
294F3dat274.

Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801 (c) states that
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence [*4] to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
While the Plaintiff argues that these statements are hearsay, LCR-M counters that, because one of the reasons
Delon was terminated was because of the excessive
number of customer complaints filed against her, Arendt's testimony that he knew of complaints being filed is
admissible.

IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Objection to
and Motion to Strike the Affidavit [*5] of Dennis Arendt IS DENIED.
Lake Charles, Louisiana, this 23 day of October,
2006.
PATRICIA MINALDI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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